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1. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1144 (Del. 1989); Kohls
v. Duthie, 766 A.2d 1274, 1281-82 (Del. Ch. 2000).
2. The effect of these “non-reliance clauses” may also be achieved in some circumstances by
inclusion of “integration clauses” (i.e., provisions to the effect that the acquisition agreement constitutes
the entire and exclusive agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter thereof).  This is because
an acknowledgment that the acquisition agreement is exclusive is tantamount to a declaration of non-
reliance on extra-contractual representations.  The likelihood of an integration clause having such an effect
will depend upon the specific language employed.  In this regard, an integration clause that specifically
references representations and warranties would likely have an effect similar to that of a non-reliance clause,
while a more customary reference only to “agreements and understandings” probably would not.
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RULE 10b-5 AND REASONABLE RELIANCE:  WHY COURTS
SHOULD ABANDON FOCUS ON NON-RELIANCE CLAUSES
Jonathan P. Altman*
INTRODUCTION
In a typical privately negotiated merger or acquisition, the parties
involved will be engaged in months of negotiations prior to the closing of their
deal.   Over the course of such, many projections, agreements, documents, oral1
representations and warranties (hereinafter “information”) will undoubtedly
be exchanged by both sides.  In the final purchase agreement, a seller typically
lists detailed representations and warranties about its business, and includes
a proviso that the buyer is not relying on any other information.   Inclusion of2
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3. A typical non-reliance clause might read:
Each of the parties is sophisticated and was advised by experienced counsel and, to the extent it
deemed necessary, other advisors in connection with this Agreement.  Buyer acknowledges that it
has performed a comprehensive due diligence investigation of the business and operations of the
Company.  Each of the parties acknowledges that:
(1) there are no representations or warranties by or on behalf of any party hereto or any of its
respective Affiliates or representatives other than those expressly set forth in this Agreement;
(2) no party has relied or will rely in respect of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated
hereby upon any document or written or oral information previously furnished to or discovered
by it or its representatives, other than this Agreement (including the Schedules hereto); and, (3)
the parties’ respective rights and obligations with respect to this Agreement and the events
giving rise thereto will be solely as set forth in this Agreement.  The Company and its Affiliates,
agents, officers, directors and shareholders will not have or be subject to any liability to Buyer
or any other person resulting from the distribution to Buyer, or Buyer’s use of, any information
not contained in this Agreement (including, without limitation, any offering memorandum
provided to Buyer).
Dechert LLP, Rule 10b-5 Claims in Stock Deals:  How Much Can You Rely on Your “Non-Reliance”
Clause? (July 9, 2003), http://www.dechert.com/library/MA_7-03_SA.pdf.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
5. See Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an NRC that is
included in “a detailed writing developed via negotiations among sophisticated business entities and their
advisors” is sufficient to show that the plaintiff’s reliance on information outside the final agreement was
unreasonable); Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding the same); Jackvony v. RIHT
Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding the same).
6. 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1068 (2003).
7. Id. at 183.
8. The AES court did not distinguish between “sophisticated” and “unsophisticated” buyers in
coming to this conclusion, although that court also noted that courts could consider the sophistication of
buyers.  Id. at 178-79.
9. Id. at 183.
this “non-reliance clause”  (hereinafter “NRC”) is intended to restrict a3
buyer’s ability to bring a fraud claim under Rule 10b-5.4
Until recently insertion of an NRC into a stock purchase agreement would
have, as a matter of law, precluded a finding of reasonable reliance by a
sophisticated plaintiff upon any information other than that contained in the
parties’ definitive agreement.   However, in 2003, the Third Circuit’s decision5
in AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co.  concluded that a sophisticated plaintiff6
may be able to show reasonable reliance on information not included in the
final agreement, even where there exists an NRC.   The court reasoned that the7
enforcement of NRCs to bar any  plaintiff’s fraud claims as a matter of law8
would be inconsistent with Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (hereinafter “Exchange Act”), which forecloses all anticipatory waivers
of compliance with the duties imposed by the Act.9
This Note will argue that a defendant’s inclusion of an NRC is irrelevant
for purposes of determining whether a plaintiff’s reliance on information not
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10. Per the language of Section 29(a), an NRC that produces a waiver of compliance with Section
10(b) (via pleading requirements of Rule 10b-5) is “void.”  If an NRC is void, it should not be a factor in
determining reasonable reliance under 10b-5.  To determine if an NRC is void, it must first be determined
whether the buyer can prove fraud under Rule 10b-5.  To prove 10b-5 fraud, the buyer must show
reasonable reliance on a material misstatement or omission by seller.  Thus, the analysis for voidness of an
NRC points to 10b-5 fraud—which points right back to the NRC to determine reasonable reliance, even
though it has not been determined if the NRC is void.  Thus, the factoring of an NRC into 10b-5’s
reasonable reliance inquiry is logically flawed.
11. See supra note 6.
12. Compare Citibank, N.A. v. Itochu Int’l Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6007, 2003 WL 1797847, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003) (precluding a plaintiff from claiming reasonable reliance on representations outside
of the final written contract), with In re DaimlerChrysler AG, 294 F. Supp. 2d 616, 623 (D. Del. 2003)
(quoting AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d 174, 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2003) for the proposition that
“the existence of a non-reliance clause is [only] one factor to consider in determining the reasonableness
of a party’s reliance”), and Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Advanta Corp., No. Civ.A.01-507, 2005
WL 2234608, at *20 (D. Del. Sept. 8, 2005) (quoting In re DaimlerChrysler AG, 294 F. Supp. 2d 616, 623
(D. Del. 2003)).
contained in the final agreement was reasonable within the context of Rule
10b-5.  An NRC cannot logically be a factor in Rule 10b-5’s “reasonable
reliance” analysis because an NRC cannot be evidence that a buyer’s reliance
on information outside the parties’ final agreement was unreasonable, when
it has yet to be determined if the NRC produces a waiver of Section 10(b) in
the first place.  Factoring an NRC into a reasonable reliance analysis thus
produces a circular inquiry.10
Courts’ interpretation of Section 29(a) has spurred questions regarding
the effectiveness of NRCs.  Is the insertion of an NRC enough to protect a
seller of stock from liability under Rule 10b-5?  If not, should the presence of
an NRC at least be a factor to consider when evaluating the reasonableness of
a buyer’s reliance on information outside of a final purchase agreement?  As
the Supreme Court declined to review the Third Circuit’s decision in AES,11
the resultant split in authority has produced varying answers to these
questions.   Part I of this Note discusses the operation of Section 29(a) within12
the context of Rule 10b-5.  Part II describes the competing judicial views on
the significance to be accorded to NRCs.  Part III addresses the faulty
premises upon which these competing views rest, and explains why NRCs are
logically irrelevant for determination of reasonable reliance under Rule 10b-5.
Lastly, Part IV will explain why use of the NRC should be abandoned
altogether.
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13. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2000).
14. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987).
15. For purposes of this Note, the only provision of the Exchange Act that will be discussed is the
antifraud provision of Section 10(b) as implemented by Rule 10b-5.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
18. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2000).  See also Azrielli v. Cohen Law
Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d
Cir. 1968)) (“Rule 10b-5 . . . makes unlawful any misrepresentation ‘that would cause reasonable investors
to rely thereon . . . .’”); Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 79 F.3d 878, 886 (9th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Atari Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 981 F.2d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 1992)) (“Justifiable reliance ‘is
a limitation on a rule 10b-5 action which insures that there is a causal connection between the
misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s harm.’”); Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 79 F.3d 609, 618
(7th Cir. 1996) (“The fact of reliance . . . is not enough by itself; that reliance must be justifiable, or
reasonable.”); One-O-One Enters., Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“[P]laintiffs’
allegations must indicate that their reliance on the allegedly fraudulent representations was reasonable.”).
I.  SECTION 29(A) WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF RULE 10B-5
Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act provides that “any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of
an exchange required thereby shall be void.”   More succinctly, the United13
States Supreme Court has recognized that “the anti-waiver provision of
Section 29(a) forbids [the] enforcement of agreements to waive ‘compliance’
with the provisions of the statute.”   Thus, in order to state whether an NRC14
should be given legal effect under the Exchange Act, it must first be
determined whether or not an NRC is an agreement that allows a defendant to
waive compliance with any provision of the Exchange Act.15
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits the “use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . [of] any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.”   To implement Section16
10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5.   In order to state a valid claim under17
Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “(1) made a misstatement
or an omission of a material fact (2) with scienter (3) in connection with the
purchase or the sale of a security (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably
relied and (5) that the plaintiff’s reliance was the proximate cause of his or her
injury.”   Only the fourth factor (reasonable reliance) falls within the scope18
of this Note.
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19. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 801 (1st Cir. 1987); Zobrist v.
Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1514 (10th Cir. 1983).
20. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Itochu Int’l Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6007, 2003 WL 1797847, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003); One-O-One Enters., 848 F.2d at 1285.
21. See David K. Lutz, Note, The Law and Economics of Securities Fraud:  Section 29(A) and the
Non-Reliance Clause, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 808 (2004).
22. AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Straub v. Vaisman
& Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976)); Kennedy, 814 F.2d at 804 (quoting Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708
F.2d 1511, 1514 (10th Cir. 1983)).
23. See cases cited supra note 12.
The issue of reasonable reliance typically arises in two scenarios:  First,
when the plaintiff has relied on information that is contradicted by the
definitive agreement;  and second, when the plaintiff has relied on19
information (or omissions) that have not been included in the final written
agreement, which contained an NRC.   These scenarios occur because parties20
often wish to use NRCs as a contractual mechanism to limit the parties’
representations to the four corners of the final contract, and preclude a party
from claiming reliance on any information that has not been included in that
contract.21
Up to this point, there has been no clear rule for determining what exactly
constitutes “reasonable” reliance.  Many factors are examined to determine
whether a plaintiff’s reliance on certain representations is justified, such as:
(1) whether a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties; (2) whether
the plaintiff had the opportunity to detect the fraud; (3) the sophistication of
the plaintiff; (4) the existence of long-standing business or personal
relationships; (5) the plaintiff’s access to all of the relevant information; (6)
the opportunity to detect fraud; (7) whether the plaintiff initiated the stock
transaction or sought to expedite the transaction; and (8) the generality or
specificity of the misrepresentations.   Thus, bearing these factors in mind,22
to determine whether a purchaser can bring suit under Rule 10b-5 (to allege
violation of Section 10(b)), the following question must be determined:  does
a seller’s inclusion of an NRC preclude a buyer from claiming that it
reasonably relied on representations and warranties that were made during the
course of negotiations, but which were not included in the parties’ final
written agreement?
II.  COMPETING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NRC’S SIGNIFICANCE
Courts have answered the above question in different ways.   While some23
courts have given dispositive weight to the presence of an NRC in a Rule
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24. See id.
25. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5; One-O-One Enters., Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1287
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Tonn v. Philco Corp., 241 A.2d 442, 445 (D.C 1968)) (“Were we to permit
plaintiffs’ use of the defendants’ prior representations (and defendants’ nondisclosure of negotiations
inconsistent with those representations) to defeat the clear words and purpose of the Final Agreement’s
integration clause, ‘contracts would not be worth the paper on which they are written.’”).
26. 91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996).
27. Id. at 348.
28. Id. at 344.
29. Id. at 339.
30. Id. at 341.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 343.
10b-5 “reasonable reliance” analysis, others have only accorded NRCs partial
evidentiary value.   Although each line of cases rests upon faulty premises,24
analysis of both is required to draw out their fallacies.
A.  The Harsco Standard
Until 2003, the standard rule of law regarding NRCs was that the
inclusion of such a clause would preclude a purchaser of stock from claiming
that it reasonably relied on any representations or warranties that were not
contained in the final agreement between the parties.   In Harsco Corp. v.25
Segui,  the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a plaintiff’s Rule 10b-526
action based upon its alleged reliance on extra-contractual representations.27
The Court of Appeals reached this holding because the presence in the
acquisition agreement of an NRC, together with fourteen pages of
representations and warranties, established that the buyer could not have
reasonably relied on any of the extra-contractual representations.28
In this case, the Harsco Corporation (hereinafter “Harsco”) sued various
former officers and shareholders of MultiServ, a company previously
purchased by Harsco, under Rule 10b-5.   Harsco alleged that “because the29
purchase price was $380 million less the amount of certain debt, including
project finance debt, [MultiServ] had a motive to misrepresent the extent to
which new projects were completed.”   Harsco claimed that MultiServ made30
various misstatements during due diligence regarding projected business
activity and expected developments in the business.   Despite the fact that the31
parties entered into a purchase agreement that was subject to confirmatory due
diligence, provided for extensive representations, and included an NRC and
merger clause, Harsco argued that the non-reliance and merger clauses of the
agreement should not bar the establishment of a claim under Rule 10b-5.32




36. See supra note 27.
37. See generally Harsco, 91 F.3d 337.
38. As previously mentioned, the “traditional view” of NRCs was the standard embodied by the
Harsco decision and its progeny.
39. 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003).
40. Id. at 180.
41. Id. at 175.
According to Harsco, it reasonably relied upon a number of representations
allegedly made by the sellers outside of the contract.33
In particular, the Harsco court concluded that the NRC at issue did not
violate Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act because the buyer did not
indiscriminately waive the protections afforded by Rule 10b-5,  but instead34
limited to a reasonable degree the universe of statements (i.e., the fourteen
pages of representations) in respect of which the buyer could assert a claim
under Rule 10b-5.   Therefore, under Harsco and its progeny, the inclusion35
of an NRC can establish, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff’s reliance on
information not included in the parties’ the final agreement was
unreasonable.   In other words, when an NRC is included in a detailed36
writing, and negotiated at arms’ length between sophisticated parties, the
Harsco rationale would consider that to be a sufficient showing to bar a
plaintiff from succeeding in a Rule 10b-5 action on the basis that it reasonably
relied on information not in the agreement.37
B.  The AES Standard
In 2003, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals broke away from the
traditional view of NRCs.   In AES v. Dow Chemical Co.,  the court held that38 39
the existence of an NRC may only be considered as one piece of evidence—as
opposed to being dispositive evidence—that a buyer unreasonably relied on
information not contained in the final agreement.40
In this case, the AES Corporation (hereinafter “AES”) claimed that Dow
Chemical (hereinafter “Dow”) and its subsidiary had violated Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act in a deal where AES bought the stock of Dow’s
subsidiary whose only asset was a contract to design and build a power plant
in the Netherlands.   AES claimed that Dow and its subsidiary made material41
misrepresentations about the power plant, as AES later realized that the plant
would cost “far more to complete than [their] due diligence investigation had
754 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:747
42. Id. at 177.
43. Id. at 178.
44. The NRC used by AES read:
We [AES] further agree that we are not entitled to rely on the accuracy or completeness of the
Information and that we will be entitled to rely solely on any representations and warranties as may
be made to us in any definitive agreement with respect to the Transaction, subject to such
limitations and restrictions as may be contained therein.
Id. at 176.
45. Id. at 180.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 181.
48. Id.
49. Insomuch as Harsco stands for the proposition that NRCs can preclude a finding, as a matter
of law, of reasonable reliance on information external to the final contract—and AES stands for the
proposition that NRCs can never preclude a finding, as a matter of law, of such reasonable reliance.
50. Compare AES, 325 F.3d at 183, with Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 1996).
51. See AES, 325 F.3d at 183; Harsco, 91 F.3d at 346.
indicated,” and would not be operative until much later than Dow and its
subsidiary had stated.   Specifically, AES claimed that Dow violated Rule42
10b-5, as it “knew specific facts about the [plant] that contradicted the
representations [made] . . . during due diligence.”   Dow claimed that its43
inclusion of an NRC  into the stock purchase agreement should preclude a44
finding that AES “reasonably relied” on any representations or warranties not
contained in the final agreement.45
The majority opinion was not willing to go so far as to hold that the
inclusion of an NRC would always preclude such a finding of reasonable
reliance.   Rather, it merely stated that a buyer will have to “show more to46
justify its reliance” if there is an NRC than if there is not one.   The opinion47
also noted that in cases where sophisticated parties have negotiated a contract
that includes an NRC, such cases “will often be appropriate candidates for . . .
summary judgment.”48
While AES and Harsco appear to stand for opposing propositions,  they49
clearly share at least one common feature:  to some degree, both of these cases
view the presence of an NRC as having some impact on whether a buyer can
claim that it reasonably relied on information that was external to the final
stock purchase agreement.   It is in this facet of their analyses that the flaw50
lies.
III.  MISINTERPRETATION OF SECTION 29(A), AND A PROPER ANALYSIS
The analyses set forth in Harsco and AES are flawed, as they respectively
view the presence of an NRC as at least evidence of unreasonable reliance.51
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52. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2000).
53. Id.
54. “Any . . . provision binding any person to waive compliance with [Section 10(b)] . . . shall be
void.”  Id.
55. “To state a valid claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) made a
misstatement or an omission of a material fact (2) with scienter (3) in connection with the purchase or the
sale of a security (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied and (5) that the plaintiff’s reliance was the
proximate cause of his or her injury.”  Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citing Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114
F.3d 1410, 1417 (3d Cir. 1997).  This Note assumes, arguendo, that elements (1), (2), (3), and (5) are
satisfied, and therefore only addresses element (4) reasonable reliance.
56. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
A defendant’s inclusion of an NRC should be irrelevant for purposes of
determining whether a seller’s reliance on information not contained in the
final agreement was reasonable under Rule 10b-5.  An NRC cannot logically
be a factor in Rule 10b-5’s “reasonable reliance” analysis because such
treatment of an NRC would give it effect before it is known whether or not the
NRC is “void” within the meaning of Section 29(a).
A.  Proposed Standard
Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act forecloses anticipatory waivers of
compliance with any provision of the Act.  Specifically, Section 29(a) states
that “[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder . . . shall be void.”   For purposes of this argument, this rule can52
be restated as such:  NRCs that violate Section 29(a) are “void.”   By the53
language of Section 29(a), an NRC is “void” if it allows a seller to waive
compliance with Section 10(b).   To determine whether the NRC in question54
has allowed a seller to waive compliance with Section 10(b), a court must first
determine whether the buyer can prove fraud under Rule 10b-5.55
In order to prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a buyer must be able to prove
that it “reasonably relied” on representations and warranties made by the seller
during negotiations, but which were not included in the final written
agreement.  To prove reasonable reliance, courts look to factors such as the
sophistication of the parties, any past relationship between them, and many
others.   This is where the flaw in the current analyses lies:  How can an NRC56
be evidence that a buyer’s reliance on information outside the parties’ final
agreement was unreasonable—when it has yet to be determined if the NRC is
void because it produces a waiver of Section 10(b)?
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57. AES Corp. v. Dow Chem., 325 F.3d 174, 184 (3d Cir. 2003) (Wallace, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1568 (7th ed. 1999); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 911 (4th ed. 2001)).
58. See AES, 325 F.3d at 183; Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 1996).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2000).
60. AES, 325 F.3d at 184 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. For purposes of this hypothetical, assume all of this “soft” information provided by Company
B is true, and that Company B has included all material facts both during their negotiations with Company
A, and in their final purchase agreement.
As previously stated, if an NRC produces a waiver of Section 10(b), then
it is “void.”  “A void clause is ‘of no effect whatsoever.’  It is ‘an absolute
nullity.’  It is ‘ineffective,’ ‘useless,’ ‘having no legal force or validity.’”   If57
the language of Section 29(a) is to be given effect, NRCs that produce waivers
of Section 10(b) should be of absolutely no evidentiary value.  In both Harsco
and AES, the courts, at the very least, viewed the presence of an NRC as
evidence that a buyer’s reliance on information outside of the agreement was
unreasonable.   By factoring the NRC into the 10b-5 “reasonableness”58
analysis before determining whether the NRC was “void,”  these courts were59
leaving open the possibility that a “void” NRC could be used in the analysis.
Indeed, as Senior Circuit Judge Wallace stated in his concurring opinion in
AES, “[i]f we permit the void stipulation to have evidentiary value, . . . [i]t
becomes a very potent weapon in the 10b-5 defendant’s arsenal.  This is
precisely what section 29(a) prohibits.”60
The possibility that a “void” NRC will be considered in a Rule 10b-5
reasonable reliance analysis is the most persuasive reason why NRCs should
be given no consideration in such analysis.  But what if the NRC is not “void”
(i.e., one that does not produce a waiver of compliance with any section or
rule of the Exchange Act)?  It makes no difference that it will not have been
considered, because the defendant will have already won the case.  Consider
the following scenario.
Company A wishes to acquire its longtime supplier, Company B.
Through the course of their negotiations, many oral and written
representations, warranties, and projections are exchanged.   In the final61
purchase agreement, which includes an NRC, Company B includes certain
representations and warranties (we’ll call them Representations 1, 2, 3, and 4).
Assume further that both parties are considered to be sophisticated.  Two
months after having completed its purchase of Company B’s stock, Company
A begins losing millions on the deal.  Upset with its plight, Company A sues
Company B for violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, claiming that
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62. For purposes of this hypothetical, as with the entirety of this Note, assume that Company A can
prove that Company B (1) made a misstatement or an omission of a material fact (2) with scienter (3) in
connection with the purchase or the sale of a security . . . and (5) that the plaintiff’s reliance was the
proximate cause of his or her injury.  Thus, the only issue being discussed is reasonable reliance.
63. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 23, 27 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 23, 25, 27 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
it believes that Company B inflated their projections (let’s call this projection
Representation 5).
To determine whether the NRC allowed Company B to waive compliance
with Section 10(b), it must be determined whether Company A can state a
claim under Rule 10b-5.   In order to resolve this inquiry, it must be62
determined whether Representation 5 was ever made; and if it was, whether
Company A may be said to have reasonably relied upon it.  Even if
Representation 5 was found to have been made, most of the reasonableness
factors which courts analyze in a Rule 10b-5 analysis speak against Company
A’s reasonable reliance.   The parties here have a long-standing business63
relationship,  they have negotiated the final purchase agreement at arms’64
length,  both parties were sophisticated,  and presumably of equal bargaining65 66
power,  and Company B has not attempted to conceal any fraud insomuch as67
it has been truthful in all of its representations and included all material facts
in the agreement.   For these reasons, the plaintiff will not prevail on its Rule68
10b-5 claim, as the court will find that there was no basis for the suit.
Because of this, the NRC cannot be viewed to have allowed Company B
to waive compliance with Section 10(b).  But at this point, of how much
importance is the existence of the NRC?  To determine whether or not the
NRC was “void,” the court first has to go through the plaintiff’s 10b-5
claim—the basis of the suit itself.  Upon finding that Company A cannot state
a claim under Rule 10b-5, the court would hold that Company B has not
violated Section 10(b).   Thus, it is of no consequence that the NRC was not69
void, because it requires the primary inquiry—whether a violation of Section
10(b) as implemented by Rule 10b-5 has occurred—to take place before it can
even be determined whether or not the NRC is void.
This hypothetical illustrates that even a non-“void” NRC cannot ever be
used as a factor in determining reasonable reliance.  While a non-“void” NRC
would be useful evidence of the buyer’s reliance on outside information, its
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70. See AES Corp. v. Dow Chem., 325 F.3d 174, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Straub v. Vaisman
& Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976)).  See also Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 804
(1st Cir. 1987); Zobrist v. Coal-X Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983).
71. Compare AES, 325 F.3d at 183, with Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 1996).
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usefulness is only realized after the buyer’s reliance is evaluated under the
reasonableness factors which courts have drawn from in the past.   To the70
extent that Harsco and AES (and their respective progenies) weigh the
existence of an NRC into the determination of a party’s reasonable reliance
on information outside the four corners of a document,  their tests are71
incorrect.  Instead of using NRCs as such evidence, they should be considered
completely irrelevant for purposes of determining whether a party may be said
to have reasonably relied on information not contained in the parties’ final
agreement.  This analysis is required by the language of Section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act, and its implementation would save courts from having to
engage in such a circular inquiry.
B.  Latent Criticisms
It may be argued that this standard, whereby NRCs are of no import in a
10b-5 reasonable reliance analysis, will lead to increased transaction costs,72
thereby lowering efficiency of the securities markets.   This may well be the73
case, but it is not within a court’s power to factor an NRC into the reasonable
reliance analysis, when the language of Section 29(a) specifically forecloses
such treatment.
Many policy-based arguments have been advanced regarding the proper
scope of an NRCs influence.  The primary dichotomy is between the law and
economics school of thought  and the behavioralist perspective.   These74 75
arguments elucidate complex issues regarding the picture of a perfectly
efficient market,  the actual behavior of market participants,  and to what76 77
extent these two views of the securities markets can coalesce.   While courts78
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often find such policy goals attractive when expounding the rationale for their
decisions,  these arguments are best suited for discussion among the79
Legislature and the Regulatory Commissions (i.e., the SEC) to which the
Congress delegates rule-making authority.
Furthermore, it may be argued that traditional notions of freedom of
contract mandate the ability to employ the use of contractual provisions such
as NRCs.   While the use of an NRC seems wholly permissible based on the80
freedom of contract principles upon which our capitalist society rests, such
tenets must be cast aside in the face of legislation requiring an opposite
conclusion.  The Exchange Act requires parties to abstain from the sort of
contracting embodied by the use of NRCs.  As such, prohibiting use of NRCs
should not be seen as compromising the maxim of freedom of contract, but
rather as merely falling in line with the wishes of Congress.  Surely the
Legislature understood the importance of parties’ ability to freely contract.
Despite that importance, the Legislature decided to curb that ability in favor
of protecting the integrity of the Exchange Act.81
IV.  RETIRING THE NRC
Parties include NRCs in their final stock purchase agreements in order to
restrict the opposite party’s ability to bring a fraud claim under Rule 10b-5.82
Because NRCs should no longer be a factor in determining reasonable reliance
in the context of Rule 10b-5, this goal is entirely frustrated.  If including an
NRC does nothing to protect a party from potential 10b-5 liability, then what
is the point in using one?  Based upon the foregoing analysis, there is none.
Retiring NRCs from use will also have the following positive effect:  less
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instances of fraud via more complete disclosures during negotiations leading
up to stock purchase agreements.
Fraud would be less prevalent in a world without NRCs.  If parties are no
longer able to rely on these Get-Out-of-Jail-Free cards, they will have only one
alternative to employ in hopes of reducing their potential to be sued for a
violation of Rule 10b-5:  absolute honesty.  Surely if a party is one-hundred
percent honest in its dealings leading up to a sale, and those dealings are well-
recorded, it has nothing to fear should the other party decide to challenge it in
court.  It may be argued that this is a less efficient result than would occur
with the use of an NRC.  Again, while this argument may have practical merit,
such arguments are more properly left to the Legislature.
Furthermore, “[a]t least where contracts of adhesion are concerned, there
is little reason to believe that the written contract” including an NRC is the
extent of the “parties’ definitive agreement.”   What is more likely the case83
is that “one party drafted the form and the other side signed it.”   Excluding84
NRCs from use will thus enhance the transparency in the parties’ negotiations
over terms to be included in and excluded from contracts,  since sellers would85
no longer be able to throw a standard, unpersonalized contract at the buyer.86
Certainly it is an age-old tenet of contract law that the more parties negotiate
over each term of a contract, the more accurately the contract will reflect each
of their intentions.   Again, while this would prolong the bargaining process,87
and likely cost more to the parties than if an NRC were able to be utilized, the
Legislature has spoken its preference for investor protection—as opposed to
contractual efficiency—within Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act.88
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that a defendant’s inclusion of a NRC is irrelevant
for purposes of determining whether a plaintiff’s reliance on information not
contained in the final agreement was reasonable under Rule 10b-5.  In a Rule
10b-5 analysis, the text of Section 29(a) requires determination of whether an
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NRC has produced a waiver of compliance with Section 10(b).  To determine
this, a plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that it reasonably relied on information
that was not contained in the final agreement in question.  Thus, there is no
logical reason why an NRC should be dispositive of,  or even “evidence of”89 90
the reasonableness of a party’s reliance on information outside the final
agreement.  The use of NRCs should be abandoned, as their validity hinges on
the exact same inquiry that a court has to engage in for any Rule 10b-5 action:
an inquiry into the reasonableness of a party’s reliance on information not
contained in the final agreement.
Courts are using the existence of NRCs as a proxy for expounding
economic policy decisions.   This is hardly the proper function of our courts,91
and it is certainly a function that is foreclosed by the language of Section
29(a).  The text of Section 29(a) clearly requires that a court first determine
whether an NRC has produced a waiver of compliance with another provision
in the Act before it may be given any evidentiary value.   Because this92
analysis is required before a court can use an NRC as a factor in its reasonable
reliance analysis, there is absolutely no reason to include them in such an
analysis.  The primary reason why parties include NRCs in their contracts is
to preclude the opposite party from bringing suit under Rule 10b-5.   Because93
NRCs should be irrelevant to Rule 10b-5 analyses, their use should be
discontinued.
